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LABOR LAw-LABoR-MAN°AGEMENT RELATIONS AcT-EFFECT OF SECTION
8(n) ON TJ3E RrGHT TO STRIKE-A union gave notice of its desire to modify
the existing collective bargaining agreement sixty days before the date when,
according to the terms of the contract, modification would be allowed. Eight
months later, but prior to the termination date of the contract, the union called
a strike. After several weeks the employees returned to work but the employer
refused to reinstate them on the ground that they had struck before the expiration date of the contract in contravention of section 8(d) of the amended
National Labor Relations Act1 and had thereby lost their employees status. On
petition to the National Labor Relations Board, held, the employees were
entitled to reinstatement. As used in section 8(d), the term "expiration date"

1

Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 142, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §l58(d).
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connotes not only the terminal elate of the contract but also an agreed date during its life when the parties may re-open the contract to modify some of its
terms. Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 34 L.R.R.M. 1410 (1954).
The problem the Board faces is whether under the provisions of section 8(d)
a union has the right to engage in an economic strike2 during the life of a fixed
term contract.3 Basically this depends upon the interpretation given to the
language of part ( 4) of the proviso to this section. Part ( 4) provides that after
notice is given of a proposed modification there can be no strike for a period of
sixty days ".•• or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs
later." Clearly a union must comply with the notice provisions.4 The question
is whether the union may strike at the end of sixty days or must wait until the
expiration of the contract. In an earlier decision, United Packinghouse Workers, 5 the Board found that this language was intended only to emphasize that
the full sixty-day waiting period must be observed even if it extends past the
termination date of the contract. This led the Board to decide that a strike at
any time during the contract term is allowed, provided the sixty-day waiting
period is observed. The court of appeals,6 in overruling the Board's decision,
held that this section prohibits any strike before the terminal date of the contract. The view in the principal case that "expiration date" includes "reopening
dates" represents a compromise position. One of the basic concepts of the framers
of the LMRA was that industrial peace could best be preserved through the
medium of collective bargaining.7 Section 8(d) was not intended to put significant limitations on labor's right to strike, but rather to give practical significance to the policy favoring the use of the collective bargaining process. This
is indicated by the wording of section 8(d), which begins with a comprehensive
definition of collective bargaining and introduces the "cooling off" provisions
with the words, ".•. the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean. . . ." If
clause (4) is read with the "or expiration date" phrase deleted, this is clearly its
import. Any contention that this phrase was intended to prohibit strikes which
were previously protected activities appears to be erroneous.8 The Board's view
in the Packinghouse Case, that these words were added simply to clarify the
intended result where notice is given less than sixty days before the expiration
date, is the only contention for which support can be found in the legislative
2 The word "strike" as used in this note refers only to economic strikes. These are
strikes for the improvement of working conditions, e.g., wages, hours. In NLRB v. Mastro
Plastics Corp., (2d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 462, it was decided that §8(d) is not applicable
to strikes in protest against an employer's unfair labor practices.
3 A contract containing an annual renewal clause is considered a :fixed term contract.
4 Section 8(d)(I) and (3).
5 89 N.L.R.B. 310 (1950).
6 Local No. 3 United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO v. NLRB, (8th Cir.
1954) 210 F. (2d) 325, cert. den. 348 U.S. 822, 75 S.Ct. 36 (1954). See also 38 MINN.
L. RBv. 886 (1954).
7 S. Rep. 104, 80th Cong., 1st sess., part I, p. 14 (1947).
s Senators Taft and Ball, both members of the committee which framed this provision,
stated that it placed no real limitation on the rights of labor. 93 CoNG. RBc. 3839, 5014
(1947).
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history. 9 Though section 8(d) was not intended to affect basically their right
to strike,10 workers engaging in economic strikes during the life of a contract
still run a serious risk of losing the protection of the LMRA. If the strike takes
place in conjunction with a reopening period they should be protected since,
in the absence of a no-strike clause in the contract, such strikes were allowed
prior to the LMRA11 and nothing therein prohibits them. However, a strike
to modify one of the fixed provisions of the contract at any other time during its
term would probably fall within the doctrine of NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing
Co.12 There the Supreme Court decided that a strike while a contract is in
effect is not a protected activity if its objective is to force a departure from some
term of the contract.13 This doctrine has since been recognized by the Board
but its application has been limited to strikes which violate a no-strike provision.14 Though no case requiring invocation of the doctrine has reached the
Supreme Court since its original determination, the Court has frequently cited
the Sands case15 without recognizing any such qualification. The fact that
Congress twice cited this case as a limitation on the right to strike16 further
supports the conclusion that the repudiation of contract doctrine is a much more
significant limitation on labor's right to strike than the ambiguous section
S(d).11
Lawrence W. Sperling

9 That the framers felt the need to clarify this becomes apparent when it is noted that
the major part of the Labor Committee's report on §8(d) is devoted to such clarification.
S. Rep. 104, 80th Cong., 1st sess., part I, p. 24 (1947). See also 93 CoNG. REc. 3839
(1947).
10 Of course it delays strikes for sixty days.
11 An arbitration board held that the union could legally strike during the reopening
period even though the contract contained a no-strike clause. U.S. Steel Subsidiaries, 1
Lab. Arb. Rep. 630 (1946).
12 306 U.S. 332, 59 S.Ct. 508 (1939).
13 It is not clear whether this doctrine would apply to a strike to add a new term to
the contract.
14 Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1947); United Packinghouse Workers, note 5 supra, at 312. See Blinn, "NLRB Policy on Strikers' Breach of CollectiveBargaining Agreements," 32 Om!. L. REv. 277 at 281-285 (1953).
15 NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 at 80, 73 S.Ct. 519 (1953).
16 S. Rep. 104, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Part I, p. 28 (1947). 93 CoNG. REc. 6442,
6443 (1947). See also 93 CoNG. REc. 6454 (1947).
17 The significance the Court places on congressional approval of its doctrines is
strongly indicated in International Union, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 245 at 260, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949).

